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Executive Summary
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) represents a novel tax expenditure
program that employs "investable" tax credits to spur production of low-income
rental housing. While it has grown into the largest source of new affordable hous-
ing in the United States and its structure is now being replicated in other programs,
the LDiTC has also drawn skepticism and calls for its repeal. We provide estimates
of tax expenditures under this program and discuss pricing, efficiency, and distri-
butional effects of the program. We also consider the impacts of the recent financial
crisis on the LEKTC program and explore implications of resulting policy changes
and proposals.
I. Introduction
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program provides for
the majority of new affordable housing units built in the United States
and has resulted in the production of 1.5 million low-income housing
units since its incepfion in 1986. The LIHTC represents a radical depar-
ture from the structure of previous supply-side housing programs, which
have generally relied on direct provision or subsidizafion of low-income
housing. In addition to being a critical federal housing program, the
LIHTC is of interest as an example of a novel type of tax expenditure pro-
gram that is spreading to other policy domains. Under the LIHTC pro-
gram, the government allocates tax credits to developers of low-income
housing, who then sell the credits, often via intermediaries, to investors
in exchange for equity financing. Credits are subsequently claimed by
investors on their tax returns. As a consequence, the tax beneficiary is
an investor rather than the provider or the targeted beneficiary of
the subsidized service. We refer to this class of credits as "investable tax
credits."
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Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth in tax expenditures for this pro-
gram. Annual tax expenditures on the LIHTC program were estimated
at $4.3 billion in 2004 and are projected to increase by almost 20% in real
terms by 2011 ( JCT, various years).^ Expenditures on the LIHTC program
relative to other federal housing programs are shown in figure 2. V\^le
tax expenditures on the LIHTC are only about a third of outlays on Sec-
tion 8 vouchers, the program is large relative to other federal supply-side
programs. In addition, several of these other programs (such as the Sec-
tion 8 Project-Based Program) are no longer active (Rice and Sard 2007).
The LIHTC is currently the largest and fastest-growing federal program
for the production of affordable rental housing.
Although the LIHTC has generally been regarded with skepticism in
the academic literature (e.g., Weisbach 2006), the program has remained
politically popular. Reforms to the program since its inception have all
been in the direction of program expansion and have generally passed
with overwhelming bipartisan support. In addition, other programs with
a similar structure have been introduced by the federal government. Un-
der the New Market Tax Credits program, for example, the federal gov-
ernment allocates tax credits to designated Community Development
Entities (CDEs). The CDE then sells these credits to investors in exchange
for equity finance, which is used by the CDE to provide investments in
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Fig. 1. JCT estimates of LIHTC tax expenditure. Source: JCT (various years). Figures for
a given year are taken from the report immediately preceding that year. All figures are in
2004 dollars. Starting from 2008, estimates are based on a -0.3 annual change in the
consumer price index, which reflects the average for 2005-7. The apparent 1-year shift
from individual to corporate claimants from 2000 to 2001 reflects a change in the method
of estimation rather than a true change in the distribution of claimants.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 183
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Fig. 2. Comparison of housing programs (2005). Sources: *Data for LIHTC tax expendi-
ture are from JCT (various years). **Data on remaining programs come from Rice and
Sard (2007). Funding esfimates for these programs are based on budget authority rather
than expenditure. The Secfion 8 Housing Choice Voucher program provides vouchers
to low-income tenants. The Section 8 Project-Based Program subsidizes affordable
rental housing. Section 515 and Section 521 provide low-interest loans to encourage the
production of affordable rental housing in rural areas. Section 202 and Section 811
provide subsidies to developers of affordable rental housing for the elderly and those
with disabilities; Secfion 811 also includes tenant-based rental assistance for the disabled.
The Home Investment Partnership provides a variety of subsidies (both project and
tenant based) for rental and nonrental affordable housing. Homeless assistance refers to
a number of programs that provide housing assistance to the homeless. See Rice and Sard
(2007) for further details.
low-income communities. The program was initiated in 2000 and has
allocated $12.1 billion in tax credits as of 2007 (GAO 2007). Recent legis-
lation has also proposed the creation of a Homeowner's Tax Credit, mod-
eled after the LIHTC, for the construction or rehabilitation of nonrental
affordable housing.^
The LIHTC program has also received a great deal of recent attention,
as the market for credits has been severely affected by the financial crisis
that began in 2007. Prices for LIH credits have fallen dramatically
through 2008 and 2009. This strain in the credit market has come pre-
cisely at a time when the need for affordable housing has arguably in-
creased greatly. These recent events have prompted the passage of new
legislative initiatives and proposals for further policy reform. In particular,
both the Housing and Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) and the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) resulted in important
changes to the LIHTC program. Many of these changes are temporary.184 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
but some permanently affect the structure of the program. We discuss
these policies in detail below.
In this paper, we provide estimates of the magnitude of LIHTC tax
expenditures and discuss efficiency costs of the program. We also present
empirical evidence on the characteristics of program participants: devel-
opers, credit claimants, and beneficiaries. Finally, we discuss recent
events in the LIHTC market as well as the potential implications of recent
tax legislation and reform proposals.
n. An Overview of the LIHTC ' ;
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) included several provisions that re-
duced the profitability of investment in rental housing. The LIHTC pro-
gram was devised as part of TRA86 to preserve incentives for the
provision of affordable rental housing. Under this program, the Internal
Revenue Service (1RS) allocates nonrefundable tax credits to housing
agencies run by the state governments, which then award the credits
to selected housing projects proposed by developers. Federal law sets
basic requirements for projects applying for LIHTC fimds to ensure that
they make a strong commitment to provide low-income housing. How-
ever, state housing agencies hold most of the power in selecting program
recipients, both through their individual plans for ranking programs and
through a significant amount of additional discretion. Developers, in
tum, sell the credits to investors in exchange for equity financing used
to support the housing project. Investors may be individuals, corpora-
tions, or financial institutions, and their return is limited to their tax ben-
efits. Intermediaries, also known as syndicators, create the market in
these tax credits. The flow of credits is depicted in simplified form in fig-
ure 3, based on GAO (1997).^
There are two types of credits allocated tonder the program. The first
type of credit ("9% credit") is allocated to projects that are newly con-
structed and receive no other federal subsidies. The federal government
allocates these credits to states in proportion to population. Initial allo-
cations were $1.25 per capita. This amount was increased (in nominal
terms) to $1.50 in 2002 and to $1.75 in 2003 and was indexed for infla-
tion thereafter. These allocations are subject to a small state minimum,
which was $2 million in 2003 and was also indexed for inflation. If a
project is financed with private-activity tax-exempt bonds, it is eligible
for the second type of credit ("4% credit"); these credits are capped only
indirectly through state private activity bond caps.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 185
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Fig. 3. Mechanics of LIHTC allocation. Source: Adapted from GAO (1997)
One dollar of allocated credit entitles the claimant to a dollar tax
credit each year for a 10-year period. The federal govemment also sets
several guidelines with which projects must comply in order to be eli-
gible for LIHTC fianding. Most important, a certain share of units must be
rent restricted and be occupied by low-income households. These condi-
tions must, in most cases, be met for a minimum of 30 years.** Conditional
on meeting these guidelines, state housing agencies have broad discre-
tionary powers in setting criteria for the credit allocation process. These
criteria are generally set out in state Qualified Action Plans (QAPs). The
normal allocation process can be overridden or bypassed; indeed, a Gen-
eral Accounting Office study found that 17 out of 20 studied QAPs con-
tained such override provisions (GAO 1997). Olsen (2003) estimates that,
on average, $3 is requested for every available $1, indicafing periods of
substanfial excess demand for LIH credits. As a result, many states have
forced developers to meet requirements that are stricter than the federal
guidelines in order to be eligible for these credits.''
Tax credits are then awarded to chosen projects. The amount of tax
credits a given project receives is determined by the qualified basis of
the project. This is the product of two factors: the first reñects the devel-
opment costs of the project, and the second refiects the share of the project
that is reserved as low-income.^ This method approximates a subsidy per
low-income unit, adjusted for development costs. Projects that are newly186 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
constructed and receive no federal subsidies other than the LIHTC
receive an amount of credits such that the present value of credits over
a 10-year period will be equal to 70% of the qualified basis. All other
projects receive credits such that the present value will be equal to
30% of the qualified basis.^ On average, one-third of the total financing
of a typical project is provided through the proceeds of the sale of tax
credits.
Once state housing agencies award credits to projects, the tax credits
become available to the developer. The developer may either use the tax
credits to reduce its own tax bills, if it is a for-profit developer, or sell the
credits to investors. Investors who buy the credits provide the developers
with equity, which is used to support the construction and creation of the
low-income housing. The deal is often structured as a limited partnership
between investors and developers. Investors, the limited partners in the
partnership, generally do not expect income from the equity but instead
view the tax credits as their return.
Note that the structure of the program creates tax benefits for investors
and intermediaries in the syndication process who have no intrinsic in-
terest in low-income housing or related issues. This creates a much wider
constituency for the program than would be the case for an economically
equivalent program of direct subsidies for low-income housing.^ This
may explain why developers, intermediaries, and housing advocates—
not by any means a natural polifical coalifion—are fans of the program.^
I I ••;
III. LIHTC Tax Expenditure Estimates |
I
In this secfion, we consider two methods to calculate tax expenditures
under the LIHTC program and compare the resulting esfimates to the
Joint Committee on Taxafion (JCT) esfimates. First, we calculate implied
tax expenditures from credits allocated. As discussed above, the LIHTC
differs from most other tax expenditures in that a large share of total ex-
penditure is capped and determined by annual per capita credit alloca-
tions. If the majority of credits are claimed, it should be possible to
estimate and project tax expenditures under this program with a reason-
ably high degree of accuracy using only information on credits allocated.
Second, we calculate tax expenditures using data from individual and
corporate tax returns. As we discuss below, the information on the
public-use files is not always sufficient to calculate actual credits claimed.
We therefore compare the resulfing tax expenditure estimates to the es-
timates from JCT and credits allocated to assess the validity of using these
data to examine the characteristics of credit claimants.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 187
A. Estimates from Credits Allocated , • -, • , ,
Figure 4 provides expenditure estimates based on credits allocated. All
credits allocated by the federal government are assumed to be claimed by
investors over the 10-year period immediately following project comple-
tion, with a 2-year lag between credit allocation and project completion.
Annual credits claimed are then adjusted to 2004 dollars. This method
will result in underestimates of total tax expenditures since it accounts
only for credits subject to the per capita cap.
Implied expenditures increase rapidly over the first decade as the pro-
gram reaches steady state. Expenditures then decline slightly as the real
value of credits allocated falls over time and increase as annual per capita
allocations are increased. Expenditure estimates are substantially higher
than JCT estimates in the early years of the program but conform closely
to JCT estimates over the recent period. This likely refiects the fact that
many of the initially allocated tax credits were left unused (GAO 1997).
Lags between federal allocation and credit claiming may also have been
longer than average in the early years of the program.
B. Estimates from Tax Return Data •
A second measure of LIHTC tax expenditure comes from credits
claimed by individuals and corporations on their tax returns. There
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Fig. 4. Tax exj:)enditure estimates from credits allocated. Figures are calculated from annual
per capita credits allocated and population figures and assume that all credits are claimed
over the 10-year period following project completion. The figures are based on federal allocation
guidelines and do not incorporate state-specific minimum allocations or changes arising
from 2008 and 2009 legislation. We allow a 2-year lag between allocation and prqect completion.188 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
are at least three reasons why information on credits claimed from tax
retum data may not accurately reflect actual annual tax expenditure on
the LIH program. ^° First, the line item for the current-year LIHTC is in-
cluded as part of the tentative credit calculation form for the general busi-
ness tax credit (Form 3800). Taxpayers may not be eligible to claim the full
amount of the tentative credit; for example, credits are nonrefundable
and carmot be used to offset alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability."
Although the total amotint of general business tax credit claimed is avail-
able on the tax retum, it is difficult to determine the exact amount of credit
claimed for these taxpayers. Second, LIH credits can in some cases be car-
ried forward or carried back. In these cases, they are included as single line
items that include the sum of all general business credit carryforwards or
carrybacks. Finally, an individual does not need to file Form 3800 if she is
not claiming any other general business credits and has no carryforwards
or carrybacks. The allowable LIH credits are then entered in the "other
credits" line item on Form 1040. While the first factor may cause these es-
timates to represent an overestimate, the second two factors may restilt in
underestimates of total LIH credits claimed from the Form 3800 line item.
Given these caveats, estimates of LIHTC tax expenditure based on pub-
licly available individual and corporate tax retum data are presented in fig-
ure 5. The individual data come from public-use samples of individual
federal tax retums.^^ Information on LIH credit clainúng is available from
1987-2002. The corporate data come fi'om table 21 of the Statistics of Income
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Year
• Corporate • Individual I '
Fig. 5. Tax expenditure esfimates from tax retum data. Source: Individual data are from
1987-2002. Figures are taken from the tentafive credit calculafion of the general businœs tax
credit (Form 3800). Individual data are taken from the public-use individual federal tax retum
sample and corporate data are from the Stafistics of Income Corporation Complete Report.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 189
Corporation Complete Report (http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/
0,,id=170734,00.html), which itemizes components of the general business
tax credit.
The estimates in figure 5 are lower than estimates from credits allocated
in the early years of the program. Again, this is likely a result of inifial cred-
its remaining either unused or claimed with a substanfial lag. In 2002, the
last year for which we have individual data, implied tax expenditure on
the program was almost $4 billion. Less than 10% of this expenditure was
from claims by individual investors.
The gap between tentative and allowable LIH credits seems likely to be
small for two reasons. First, investors must actively purchase credits and
would not do so unless they expected to claim the full value. Second,
while it is possible that investors could unexpectedly become ineligible
to claim the full value, there is a secondary market for credits that allows
investors to sell credits they cannot claim. ^'' A similar argument applies
to carryforwards and carrybacks: such claims would arise if investors are
not able to claim the full annual allocation in a given year. One imperfect
estimate of the magnitude of these biases is to examine what share of ten-
tative credit dollars is "claimed" by investors with AMT liability.^'* Using
the individual public-use files for 1987-2002, we find that less than 10%
of all individual credit dollars are from AMT payers. The possibility re-
mains that individuals are ineligible to claim the full value of credits for
other reasons, and the corporate AMT "claim" share may be quite differ-
ent from the share for individuals. In addifion, some credits claimed by
individual investors may not appear on Form 3800. We imforttinately do
not have the necessary data to quantify the magnitude of these biases.
Overall, the estimates from these tax data imply slightly higher tax ex-
penditures than the JCT esfimates and estimates from credits allocated,
consistent with tentative credits being an overestimate of final credits
claimed. However, the aggregate trends over time as well as the shift
from individual claims to corporate claims do track the estimates from
the other data sources fairly well. We are therefore reasonably confident
in using these figures as an approximation of credits claimed when we
examine the characterisfics of credit claimants below.
IV. Credit Pricing and Economic Efficiency
A. Determinants of Credit Prices and Trends over Time
An interesting feature of the LIHTC program is that purchasers of cred-
its do not generally receive income from the property; the difference190 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
between the purchase price and the value of the credit represents the re-
tum on the investment. However, credit prices sometimes deviate from
the actuarially fair value. In the case of the LIHTC, the price at which
credits are sold has increased substantially over the life of the program.
Ernst & Yoimg (2005) calculates the equity price simply as housing credit
equity divided by housing credits. By this measure, median credit prices
have increased from approximately $0.45 in the early years of the pro-
gram to over $0.85 for projects placed into service in 2005.^^ Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the very low initial pricing was primarily the re-
sult of uncertainty about the rules of the system and about how long it
would last. . • I I ,
Calculating the price in this way implicitly assumes that investors are
realizing the full nominal value of credits received. In practice, however,
investors realize the credits over a 10-year period. To obtain a "true"
price, which reflects the equity per effecfive credit dollar, the stream of
tax credits should be discounted. Discounting credits appropriately sub-
stanfially increases the implied equity price: Cummings and DiPasquale
(1999) estimate that the average credit price over their sample period
(1987-96) increases from $0.52 to more than $0.70 if the present value
of the stream of credits (using a discount rate of 6.7%) is used in the price
calculations.
Historical prices below actuarially fair values may have reflected ad-
difional compensation for the risk of default: projects may fail to remain
in compliance over the full lifetime of the credits. If a property is found
to be in noncompliance, the investor forfeits future tax credit claims and
must repay one-third of previously claimed credits with interest. The
monitoring costs associated with ensuring that the developers are in
compliance and the discounting of the risk of developer noncompliance
could result in a risk premium. Empirically, this risk premium appears
negligible: just before the recent financial crisis, credits were trading at
or above their actuarially fair value, consistent with evidence indicating
that the ex post probability of punishment appears low. Ernst & Young
(2005) finds that only 0.4% of surveyed properties had been audited and
faced a loss of tax benefits in the form of recapture or disallowance of
future claims.^^ While the average risk of noncompliance may be small,
risk may help to explain cross-sectional variation in credit prices. Using
data from LIHTC transactions in Califomia, Eriksen (2009) finds that
projects with characteristics correlated with an increased risk of noncom-
pliance are associated with lower tax credit prices. This suggests that
states may be able to use credit prices as an effective ex ante screening
device when choosing how to allocate credits across proposed projects.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 191
In many respects, the puzzling feature of credit prices (untü the very re-
cent period) was not why they are too low, but rather why they appear too
high. In recent years, credit prices approached or exceeded one when the
stream of tax credits is discounted appropriately.^'' A possible explanafion
for this anomaly is that for certain financial institutions, investment in low-
income housing can serve to safisfy some of their obligations under the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The CRA requires banks and other
depository insfitufions to provide credit throughout their local commu-
nities, including in low-income areas. CRA evaluations are subjective
and are based on a diffuse set of metrics that are deliberately not quanfi-
fied. The record of the financial insfitufion is reviewed and taken into ac-
count when regulators evaluate applications for deposit facüifies or during
mergers. As such, there are no specific, quantifiable linkages between
LIHTC purchases and CRA ratings, though it is widely acknowledged
that LIHTC can count toward the hardest standard for banks, the invest-
ment of resources into their low-income communities. A 2003 report
estimated that 43% of low-income housing investors were financial insfi-
tutions subject to CRA requirements (Ernst & Young 2003). The interacfion
with the CRA opens up the possibility that entities may be wüling to bid
the price of tax credits above their actuarially fair value as they can jointly
realize tax advantages and fulfül CRA obligafions.^** Such mechanisms for
increasing the funding for the supply of low-income housing should,
however, be balanced against possible inefficiencies stemming from
any expansion of CRA obligations.
Credit prices may also experience short-term fiuctuafions as a result of
supply and demand shocks. Most notably, the puncturing of the bubble in
the U.S. housing market in 2007 and the subsequent financial crisis of 2(X)8
have had profovind consequences for the LIHTC program. Prior to the crisis,
$1 of tax credits traded at an undiscounted price of nearly $0.90;^^ by early
2009, the corresponding price had faüen below $0.70 (see, e.g.. Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas 2009). This price decline reflects decreased investor
demand for LIH credits, due principally to two factors. First, the large losses
incurred by banks and other financial insfitufions rendered tax credits sig-
nificanfiy less valuable. A second major development was the exit from this
market of two major buyers of LIH credits, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
which entered government conservatorship in September 2008.
ß. Efficiency of the Program
A notable feature of the LIHTC is that a large share of credits (specifi-
cally, the 9% credits) are capped. This means that there is no budgetary192 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
uncertainty about the amount of resources committed by the government
to low-income housing, which may be politically advantageous. How-
ever, there is imcertainty over the actual provision of housing; in particu-
lar, lower prices of credits may dictate that fewer housing units are
constructed. For example, the decreased market value of LIH credits dur-
ing the recent crisis has had a severe negative impact on the ability of
developers to obtain equity financing through the sale of credits.^" At
the same time, a number of developments have potentially increased
the demand for low-income rental housing. For instance, would-be
homeowners now face greater difficulty in obtaining credit to purchase
houses. There has also been an increase in unemployment associated
with the recession. Demand has also increased from former homeowners
whose houses have been foreclosed on or who have decided to abandon
houses in which they had negative equity.^^ This extreme case illustrates
a more general issue with the structure of the LIHTC program: credit
prices and the supply of affordable housing through this program may
fluctuate with aggregate economic conditions.
In addition to variability in the prices of credits, it is important to note
that not all of the equity finance received through the sale of credits goes
into housing projects; there are a number of transactions costs associated
with most LIHTC projects. Indeed, the GAO (1997) estimates, for example,
that syndication costs may consume 10%-27% of equity invested in LIH
credit projects. Consistent with this finding, Cummings and DiPasquale
(1999) find that the average ratio of net equity to gross equity in their data
is 0.71. Syndication costs appear to be declining over time as the market
has become more competitive. It is also important to note that many proj-
ects constructed with LIH credits also benefit from additiorial supply-side
subsidies, such as tax-exempt bond financing and Section 515 rural hous-
ing loans. In addition, a substantial share of residents in these housing
projects are recipients of Section 8 vouchers or other forms of rental assis-
tance.^ Therefore, while the LIHTC program is credited with great success
in the production of affordable housing, it is not clear that the program
would be successful in meeting project goals were it to exist in isolation.
This evidence leaves open the question of whether new construction is
the most efficient means of getting housing assistance to low-income
households or whether subsidies should instead be provided in the form
of demand-side programs, such as vouchers. The relative merits of supply-
side programs and vouchers are a subject of ongoing debate, and some
(e.g., Weisbach 2006) have advocated replacing the LIHTC with a vovicher
program. A potential disadvantage of vouchers is their effect on market
rents: Susin (2002) and Gibbons and Manning (2006), for example, findTax Incentives for Affordable Housing 193
large effects on rent subsidies on rents. Since rent voucher programs
cover only a relatively small fraction of people with low incomes, recipi-
ents of vouchers may be better off on balance despite the rent increases,
but there is a larger populafion of low-income noru-ecipients who face
higher rents without receiving any government assistance. In contrast,
supply-side housing policies not only benefit those low-income families
that obtain the new housing but also may potenhally benefit the wider
low-income population through lower market rents (Coate, Johnson, and
Zeckhauser 1994).
However, these benefits depend on whether housing provided under
this program increases the net supply of low-income housing or simply
crowds out other low-income housing. Esfimates suggest that crowd-out
is likely to be substantial: Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) estimate crowd-
out of up to two-thirds from government-subsidized housing generally,
Malpezzi and Vandell (2002) estimate full crowd-out from the LIHTC
program, and Eriksen and Rosenthal (2008) estimate crowd-out of be-
tween one-half and one. There is, however, some evidence that the LIHTC
program increases supply at very local levels. Baum-Snow and Marion
(2009) exploit a discontinuity in the LIHTC program. Specifically, a census
tract qualifies for discontinuously higher funding (a 30% increase in the tax
credit) if more than 50% of its hotoseholds have incomes below a certain
threshold (60% of area median gross income). They find a large impact
of this discontinuity on the supply of LIHTC housing. They also find that
LIHTC-funded housing increases owner turnover, reduces neighborhood
income in gentrifying areas, and increases property values in declining
areas.
On balance, the available empirical evidence suggests that rent vouch-
ers are likely to be more cost effective than the LIHTC program. Deng
(2006) computes the costs associated with LIHTC-funded developments
and vouchers in six U.S. metropolitan areas and finds that vouchers are
generally less costly. However, it is important to note that there is consid-
erable heterogeneity in the relafive costs, depending on housing market
conditions in the metropolitan area, the type of housing, and various
other factors. Supply-side remedies may thus be preferred for particular
targeted groups or in certain geographic areas. Certain groups, such as
large households, single nonelderly persons, and the elderly, statisfically
have a lower chance of success in using their vouchers (Finkel and Buron
2001). There may also be markets in which the LIHTC is less costly than
vouchers (DiPasquale, Fricke, and Garcia-Diaz 2003). Finally, LIHTC-
funded developments may achieve better outcomes along other dimen-
sions, such as neighborhood integration and school quality (Deng 2007).194 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
There are three other considerafions that are relevant when thinking
about the efficiency consequences of the structure of the LIHTC program
specifically. First, the fact that producers need not be the claimers of cred-
its may be beneficial for productive efficiency. If credits are not refund-
able and not transferable, then parficipafion in the program will be fied to
a provider's tax liability. Investable tax credits neutralize the bias toward
for-profit providers inherent in a nonrefundable tax credit; this feature is
particularly critical if the dominant organizational form for delivering
the producfion is nonprofit. Such a market can also improve productive
efficiency if there is heterogeneity among for-profit providers and more
efficient providers do not have sufficient tax liability to utilize the full
value of the credits. |
In this sense, the provision of investable tax credits tander the LIHTC is
closely analogous to the widespread use of leasing as a means of trans-
ferring tax benefits (such as depreciation allowances) among firms. The
leasing market allows firms facing relatively low marginal tax rates to
benefit from investment incentives by allowing a firm facing a high mar-
ginal tax rate to be the legal owner of a piece of equipment. Specifically,
Congress's experiment with "safe harbor" leasing removed most obsta-
cles for the transfer of tax benefits through leasing arrangements as part of
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (see Warren and Auerbach 1982).
This provision proved to be short-lived because of perceived abuses,
and these concerns have limited more expansive efforts in the leasing do-
main. However, the leasing market continues to serve this basic funcfion to-
day. Investable tax credits accomplish the same separation of the legal tax
beneficiary from the agent underiaking the targeted activity. This analogy
also makes clear that transferability of tax benefits is not a unique feature
of the LIHTC and has important precedents elsewhere in the tax system.
Second, investors claim credits over a 10-year horizon. This provides
a mechanism for the developer to receive up-front financing for the proj-
ect while maintaining the ability of the government to enforce program
guidelines after the project is built through the threat of recapture of cred-
its from investors. This structure may therefore be preferable to direct
subsidies or refundable credits that allocate the entire subsidy to the de-
veloper prior to project completion.
Finally, the investable nature of the program allows for the creation of
delegated monitors to ensure compliance with housing agency and 1RS
requirements. Without the investable feature of the program, housing
agencies and the 1RS would be exclusively monitoring compliance of
the many projects. With investable tax credits, monitoring is largely under-
taken by the investors and their agents (often accounting firms) since theirTax Incentives for Affordable Housing 195
enfire economic retum for their investment is contingent on compliance.
If there are differential monitoring capabilifies, this delegation of moni-
toring can be an important dimension to the desirability of the LIHTC.^"'
Note that, in pracfice, the incenfives for investors to monitor depend on
the govemment oversight of the program. The 1RS requires state housing
agencies to develop compliance monitoring programs that meet certain
federal guidelines and report cases of noncompliance. However, the 1RS
has no specific authorization to evaluate or audit state housing agencies
to ensure that they are actually meeting these federal guidelines, and
some evidence suggests that the agencies may not in fact always be fully
compliant with their oversight responsibilities (GAO 1997). As dis-
cussed, the 1RS rarely recaptures credits in practice, and it is not clear
whether this is a result of effective morutoring and high project compli-
ance or simply poor govemment oversight.
V. Distribution of LIHTC Tax Expenditure
Determining the true economic incidence of the LIHTC program is quite
challenging for several reasons. Credit allocafion formulas reflect a range
of factors, including development costs and other received subsidies. In
addition, states often allocate credits to developers willing to serve par-
ticular target populafions or meet affordability guidelines that are stricter
than federal requirements. Finally, most low-income housing projects re-
ceive additional federal supply- and demand-side subsidies, making it
difficult to isolate the effects of the LIHTC. We focus instead on examin-
ing the distribution of three groups affected by the program: providers of
low-income housing, investors in LIH credits, and low-income house-
holds that benefit from the program.
A. Distribution of Providers
As discussed above, an advantage of the "investable" feature of the
LIHTC program is that it levels the playing field between for-profit
and nonprofit developers. Federal law requires states to reserve 10% of
LIHTC funds for projects with nonprofit developers, but this require-
ment does not appear to be binding in practice. Figure 6 illustrates the
share of LIHTC-funded projects developed by nonprofit developers by
year placed into service. This share increased rapidly in the early years of
the program, peaked at over 35% in 1998, and has since declined slightly
to 25% in 2003. Some states do have additional nonprofit set-asides
or favor nonprofits in their QAPs (Gustafson and Walker 2002), but it196 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
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Fig. 6. Share of projects completed by a not-for-profit developer Source: U.S. Housing
and Urban Development LMTC database. Year refers to year placed in service.
is unlikely that these provisions alone can explain the observed levels of
participafion of nonprofits in this market. i
ß. Distribution of Credit Claimants
1. Individuals '
i
A surprising feature of individual LIHTC investors is that they are small:
between 1987 and 2002, the average credit among claimers was slightly
more than $3,000. The number of claimants has remained fairly constant
over time, but the credit claimed per return has declined substanfially, as
shown in figvtre 7. Among claimers, the average credit per return almost
halved between 1995 and 2002, declining from $4,100 to $2,100 in real
terms. This implies both an overall shift toward corporate investors
and a shift toward smaller investments among remaining individual
investors. ' |
To examine the distribufion of individual claimants, an approximafion
of cash income can be constructed from the public-use data files.^'* Fig-
ure 8 plots the share of the annual value of credits claimed by individuals
by income category between 1999 and 2002. There are two features to note.
First, the distribufion is hump shaped in each year. This is not surprising:
low-income individuals may not have tax liability to offset, and higher-
income individuals (except those at the very top of the distribufion) are
more likely to be subject to the AMT. Second, the distribufion of creditsTax Incentives for Affordable Housing 197
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Fig. 7. LIHTC claimed by individual investors. Source: PubUc-use sample of individual
tax retums (1987-2002). LIHTC claimed is calculated from the LIHTC line item in the
tentative general business tax credit calculation.
claimed shifts noticeably down the income distribution between 2000 and
2001. In particular, the share of credit value claimed by those in the
$100,000-$250,000 income category declines and appears to shift to the
two income categories that are immediately below.^^ These findings
suggest that the AMT may have significant effects on the distribution
of credit claimants and may help to explain both the overall shift toward
0.45
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Year
2002
Fig. 8. Distribution of claimants by income. Source: Public-use sample of individual
tax returns (1987-2002). LIHTC claimed is calculated from the LIHTC line item in the
tentative general business tax credit calculation. Income refers to an approximation of
cash income (see the text for details).198 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
corporate investors and the move toward lower-income, smaller individ-
ual investors.^^
2. Corporafions
Tabulafions by income category are not available in the published corpo-
rate reports. The reports do tabulate claims by sector, which is perhaps a
more interesting categorization for corporate claimants. Table 1 illus-
trates the share of annual credit value claimed by various sectors in
2000 and 2006. We include data fi-om the five sectors in the Stafistics of
Income classification that account for the largest shares of credit value
claimed as well as data for the real estate and rental and leasing sectors.
The majority of corporate credits are claimed by corporations in two
sectors: finance and insurance and management of companies (holding
companies). These two sectors have also accoimted for a larger share of
LIH credit dollars claimed over time. Together, corporations in these
sectors claimed 65% of corporate credit dollars in 2000 and 89% in
2006. There is nothing in the structure of the LIHTC program alone that
suggests that claiming of credits should be so concentrated across sec-
tors. These findings strongly suggest that corporafions in these sectors
derive addifional benefits from investments in low-income housing.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the real estate sector accounts for a
negligible share of credits claimed. In part, this suggests that the separa-
fion of the provision of the service from the tax beneficiary allowed by
investable tax credits has been important.
Table 1
Distribution of Corporate Claimants by Selected Sectors i i
Share of Annual Value of
Corporate Creiiits
Claimed
Finance and insurance
Management of companies (holding companies)
Ufilifies
Manufacturing
Information
Real estate and rental and leasing
2000
33.4 i
31.5
• ».«1 1
14.7 1
5.43 :
1.02
2006
42.9
45.6
NA
4.11
3.56
.06
Source: Public table 21 of the Corporation Complete Report from the 1RS. LIHTC claimed
is calculated from the LIHTC line item in the tentafive general business tax credit calculafion.
Note: The table includes the five sectors that account for the largest shares of credits claimed
as well as the real estate sector.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 199
C. Distribution of Beneficiaries -• •
Overall, it appears that the program is successful in providing affordable
housing to households with below-average incomes, but it may not ben-
efit those with the very lowest incomes. This is not surprising since the
income limits for rent-restricted units are 50%-60% of area median in-
come, although the additional use of vouchers or other rent subsidies
may help to make the units affordable for lower-income households. A
survey of properties placed into service between 1992 and 1994 indicates
that three-quarters of households in LIHTC properties had income below
50% of the area median and 40% had income below 30% of the area me-
dian income (GAO 1997). Thirty-nine percent of resident households
received direct rental assistance, and their average income was 25%
of the area median. Similar patterns have been observed in other sur-
veys of LIHTC properties (Ernst & Young 1997). We do not attempt to
examine the effects of the program on other (nonresident) low-income
households.
VI. Recent Tax Reforms
Congress has responded to the recent problems in the LIHTC market by
adopting various measures to encourage the supply of low-income hous-
ing, within the context of its overall strategy of "economic stimulus." The
HERA, enacted in July 2008, included provisions designed both to make
LIH credits more attractive to investors and to expand the scale of the
LIHTC program (see Keightley 2009). In particular, HERA established
a floor for the annual credit rate (as a percentage of a project's eligible
basis) obtained by investors in LIH credits. The act also increased LIHTC
allocafions to the states by 10% for 2008 and 2009.
In addition, HERA allowed LIH credits to be used to offset AMT liabil-
ity. A number of housing advocates had argued strongly for enabling
credits to be used against AMT liability in order to make credits attractive
to investors who are subject to the AMT or who are concerned about
facing the AMT over the lifetime of the credits. Since credit allocations
are fixed, this provision should not substantially affect tax expenditure
on the program.^^ In theory, this change may shift credit claiming back
to individual investors (especially those with higher incomes), since this
group is more likely to be constrained by the AMT. This could shift the
distribution of investors, which could affect the effectiveness of the pro-
gram in producing low-income housing as well as the types of projects
built under the program. Projects with corporate investors tend to have200 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
1
lower syndicafion costs (Ernst & Young 1997) and are likely to be more
effecfive at ex post monitoring than a diffuse group of small individual
investors, resulting in a reducfion of risk and higher credit prices. A shift
back to individual investors could therefore decrease the amount of equity
financing available for low-income housing. The changing distribufion of
investors may also influence the types of projects that are financed under
the program. A report by the National Association of Home Builders
(2005), for example, argued that individual investors tend to prefer smaller
projects and may be more likely to prefer rural projects as well as projects
catering toward special-needs populations. However, the applicafion of
credits against the AMT may have a small effect relafive to the growing
use of LIH credits by corporations against CRA requirements. To the
extent that this effect dominates, credit claiming may confinue to shift
increasingly toward corporations.
More recently, the ARRA, signed into law by President Obama on
February 17,2009, marked a significant departure for the LIHTC through
the introduction of a credit exchange program. Specifically, ARRA au-
thorized the Treasury to make cash grants to the states in lieu of part
of their LIHTC allocations (Keightley 2009). For example, a state was per-
mitted to elect to receive as cash grants up to 40% of its 2009 LIH credit
allocations (as well as to receive grants in exchange for unused credits for
2008). The federal govemment will pay $0.85 for each $1 of LIH credits
given up by the state. The idea underlying this provision is that states
would award these funds to developers to pursue projects that conform
to LIHTC requirements. These projects need not have any other LIHTC
funding, although developers are required to demonstrate that they have
made a good-faith effort to obtain equity investment. The funds awarded
in this way are not taxable income to the recipients and do not reduce the
project's eligible basis for LIHTC purposes. This LIHTC exchange pro-
gram will essentially bypass the current depressed market for LIH cred-
its. The provision is anticipated to have a substantial budgetary impact,
relative to the overall size of the LIHTC program.^^
I
VII. Conclusion • I '
The LIHTC program has become the primary federal program subsidizing
the development of low-income housing and appears to have broad sup-
port among policy makers, low-income housing advocates, developers,
and insfitufional investors. Recent and proposed reforms to the program
have been in the direcfion of further expansion, and the structure of the
LIHTC has been replicated in other related federal and state programs.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 201
Several features of the LIHTC program distinguish it from tradifional
supply-side provision or subsidizafion. The unbundling of the service
provider and the tax beneficiary has potential advantages for competi-
tion and productive efficiency. This unbundling also creates better incen-
tives for ex post monitoring and compliance in theory, although it is not
clear whether these benefits are being realized in practice. However, the
LIHTC structure also means that the success of the program in delivering
affordable housing thus depends on the incenfives of a variety of market
participants.
Tax expenditures under the program are quite predictable, but the
supply of housing provided for a given level of tax expenditure (even
abstracting from general equilibrium effects) can vary. Corporations
are now the primary investors in LIH credits, and their incentives may
reflect features of not only the LIHTC program specificaüy but also re-
lated programs, such as CRA requirements. :
The recent crisis has illustrated the potential vulnerability of the pro-
gram to aggregate market conditions. Several provisions of recent policy
reforms have loosened the supply of credits or made the terms of their
use more favorable but have not altered the program's fundamental
structure. However, the replacement of some LIHTC allocations by cash
grants represents a significant (albeit partial and perhaps temporary)
shift in program design from the "investable tax credit" model discussed
earlier toward the direct subsidy approach. In view of this, analysis of the
relative merits of the LIHTC structure and a tradifional subsidy appears
more pertinent than ever.
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1. Expenditure growth in the early years of the program primarily reflects lags between
credit allocation and claiming; later expenditure growth reflects expansions in annual
credit allocations.
2. In addition, 15 states have enacted state LIHTC programs to supplement the federal
LIHTC program. Most of these programs have a structure similar to that of the federal
program.
3. For other overviews of the program, see Burman (2005) and U.S. Treasury (2008).
4. In particular, projects must meet either a 20-50 rule (at least 20% of the units in the
development must be rent restricted and occupied by households with incomes at or below
50% of the area median income) or a 40-60 rule (at least 40% of the units in the development202 Desai, Dharmapala, and Singhal
must be rent restricted and occupied by households with incomes at or below 60% of the
area median income).
5. States may, e.g., require developers to meet stricter rent requirements or remain in
compliance for a longer period than mandated by the federal guidelines.
6. More specifically, the qualified basis is the product of the eligible basis, the amount
of all applicable depreciable development costs, and the applicable fraction. The eligible
basis includes most depreciable costs but excludes such costs as the acquisition costs of
land and permanent financing costs. The project may be eligible for a "basis boost" of
30% if it is located in a U.S. Housing and Urban Development-designated high-cost area.
The applicable fraction is either the fraction of units or the fraction of floor space (which-
ever is lower) reserved as low-income units. A potential concern with this method is that
the subsidy amount is set ex ante without a mechanism to adjust the subsidy ex post for
changes in operating costs or area median income; see Usowski and Hollar (2008) for
further discussion.
7. Technically, the eligible basis is multiplied by an "applicable percentage" that is meant
to produce a credit allocation equivalent to the present values given above. This leads to
applicable percentages of approximately 9% and 4%, respectively. In practice, the percent-
ages are set by the Treasury monthly and fluctuate with interest rates. If the amount of
credits required to attract enough equity finance to fill the financial deficit is less than this
calculated amount, the project receives the lower amount. The 2008 HERA set a floor for the
credit rate for new construction completed before 2014 at 9%.
8. There is perhaps an analogy here with Ferejohn's (1986) account of the Food Stamp
Program, which argues that the program was enacted as the result of a (seemingly un-
natural) coalition between rural legislators with farming constituencies and urban legis-
lators representing the urban poor.
9. The LIHTC also can create odd political coalitions in other policy dimensions. For
example, LIHTC advocates suggested that the initial proposal for dividend exemption in
2003 would depress the market for tax credits and opposed the proposal on that basis.
10. We are grateful to Tom Holtmann at JCT for several helpful discussior\s on these
issues.
11. The credits included in the general business tax credit are then subject to a stacking
order that determines which credits are claimed first.
12. See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/weber.pdf for sampling details.
13. There are some conditions placed on investors who wish to sell their interests in
LIHTC properties. In particular, until recently, the investor had to purchase a "recapture
bond," which guarantees payment to the Treasury in the event of tax credit recapture due
to noncompliance. This was repealed under HERA.
14. Until 2008, LIH credits could not be used to offset AMT liability. Therefore, these
tentative credits are presumably not actually claimed by investors.
15. Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) find similar patterns in their surveyed properties.
16. The low probability of punishment may arise from low noncompliance or ineffec-
tive monitoring. The 1RS is largely dependent on monitoring by state housing agencies,
and a GAO review found a number of potential problems in state oversight procedures
(GAO 1997).
17. Many participants employ an after-tax yield to measure pricing more accurately to
catch the temporal aspects of the credits. Participants then use comparisons between these
yields and municipal bonds to benchmark appropriate pricing. When yields are lower than
municipal bonds, most participants believe that CRA incentives, discussed below, are
operative.
18. Marquis and Guthrie (2007) discuss the interactions between the CRA and the LIHTC
at length. They cite Federal Reserve analyses of bank mergers that highlight LIHTC invest-
ments as ways of satisfying CRA requirements. Marquis and Guthrie go on to argue that
states design their LIHTC programs, in part, to help barJ^s address CRA guidelines in order
to foster merger activity.
19. As discussed earlier, this price corresponds to one that may have exceeded $1 when
tax credits are appropriately discounted; this point does not, however, affect the magni-
tude of the postcrisis decline in prices.
20. For examples of projects that have lost financing as a result, see Terry Pristin, "Shovel
Ready, but Investor-Deprived," New York Times, May 6, 2009.Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing 203
21. However, the end of the housing bubble has increased housing affordability, as
house prices have declined from their previously excessive levels toward their fundamen-
tal values.
22. See Cummings and DiPasquale (1999) for estimates of the total development costs
of housing produced under the LIHTC program and Deng (2006) for comparisons with
the voucher program.
23. Thanks to Michael Novogradac for highlighting this point to us.
24. In particular, we use the following definition for income: cash income = adjusted
gross income - saving and loan tax refunds + individual refirement account deducfion +
student loan interest deduction + alimony paid deducfion + tuition and fees deducfion +
health savings account deducfion + 1/2 of self-employment tax + penalty on early with-
drawal of saving + self-employed health insurance deducfion + medical savings account
deducfion + Keogh deducfion + tax-exempt interest + nontaxable social security benefits -
min (other income, 0). Not all components are available in all years, so we construct a mea-
sure as close as possible to the above definition in each year.
25. Those with very high incomes are likely to have regular tax liability that exceeds the
AMT. This may be one explanafion for why the claim share for those in the highest in-
come category ($1 million and above) remains fairly stable over this period. The change in
distribution of individual investors could be more precisely attributed to the AMT by
comparing changes in the distribufion across states with high vs. low shares of AMT tax-
payers. This is unfortunately not possible in the public-use files since the state of resi-
dence is not available for those with adjusted gross incomes greater than $200,000.
26. Individual investments in LIH credits are also limited by passive loss limitafions.
We thank Rob Dietz for highlighting this point to us.
27. In theory, allowing credits to be used to offset the AMT could increase tax expen-
ditures under the program if some investors were previously unable to claim purchased
credits after being hit by the AMT. This effect seems likely to be small since investors were
well aware of the AMT provisions and made purchasing decisions taking into account the
likelihood that they would be subject to the AMT over the life of the credits. In addition,
investors could make use of carryforward allowances and the secondary market for cred-
its, making it likely that most credits allocated were eventually claimed.
28. The JCT estimates a cost of $419 million over the 10-year budget horizon (Keightley
2009).
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